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Maastricht criteria are well known to be arbitrarily designed. To top it all off, 
times and again they’ve been only briefly fulfilled and –worse even- often 
manipulated with. Among them, fiscal criteria and overall Stability and Growth 
Pact are perhaps the most controversial of all, as recent problems within the 
EMU amply demonstrate. Moreover, the epicentre of the EMS, so-called ERM2, 
and convergence criterion in this regard seem to be much more effective in 
protecting the interests of those already in the Eurozone, rather than serving as a 
vehicle for faster and safer euro-accession of the candidates. In addition, since 
some of the convergence criteria, quite regardless of their dubious effectiveness, 
leave room for ambiguous interpretations, let alone the often forgotten real 
convergence criteria earmarked in the Treaty as a carte blanche, existing 
members of the EMU in times of unprecedented economic hardships may well be 
tempted to block candidate countries on their way to Euroland. All of these issues 
raise numerous questions and urge for fundamental reassessment of the 
Maastricht criteria, as well as point at considering their reform or indeed 
alternative policy options from the view point of candidate- and acceding 
countries.  
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INTRODUCTION 
EU is and always has been a highly political creature. As such, in fact, it seems to 
have been driven by notorious discretion more than by (often formally proclaimed) 
level-playing-field rules, virtually at all times and instances - except when it really 
didn’t make any sense to firmly stick to them. Both retrospect and prospect of 
European monetary integration have repeatedly illustrated this trait and perhaps 
most vividly so. In spite of coming to an age this year, convergence criteria -as a 
set of preconditions for joining the EMU- are by no means exception to that 
pattern. 
 
Maastricht criteria are well known to be arbitrarily designed.4 To top it all off, 
times and again they’ve been only briefly fulfilled and –worse even- often 
manipulated with. Among them, fiscal criteria and overall Stability and Growth 
Pact are probably the most controversial of all, as recent problems within the 
EMU amply demonstrate. As a matter of fact, global financial meltdown has 
uncovered alarming dissonance between unprecedented fiscal profligacy in 
Eurozone countries on one hand and self-inflicting fiscal austerity in candidate 
and acceding countries on the other [Darvas, 2009]. Moreover, the epicentre of 
the EMS, so-called ERM2, and convergence criterion in this regard seem to have 
been much more effective in protecting the interests of those already in the 
Eurozone, rather than serving as a vehicle for faster and safer euro-accession of 
the candidates [Fölsz, 2003]. In addition, since some of the convergence criteria, 
quite regardless of their dubious effectiveness, leave room for ambiguous 
interpretations, existing members of the EMU in times of unprecedented 
economic hardships may well be tempted to lock in candidate countries in such a 
(for members) comfortable status quo: for as long as outsiders pursue national 
consensus to be promoted into EU/Euroland, their economic policies (and more) 
remain under control of E(M)U [Lavrač, 2004], [De Grauwe, 2009]. All of these 
issues raise numerous questions and urge for fundamental reassessment of 
Maastricht criteria, as well as point at considering their reform or indeed 
alternative policy options from the view point of acceding countries like Serbia.   
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 gives the overview of 
convergence criteria and ERM2, section 3 deals with oddity of each and every 
Maastricht criterion from the perspective of the present moment and potential new 
entrants, while the section 4 reiterates corrective proposals, counter-weighs 
principal costs and benefits and eventually concludes. 
 
                                                     
4 For early intellectual critiques, consult Buiter, Corsseti and Roubini (1993) and Wickens 
(1993). 
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OVERVIEW OF THE MAASTRICHT CRITERIA 
In order to qualify for the Euroland, apart from having to be a member of the EU5, 
each candidate country must conform to at least five convergence criteria- defined 
18 years ago in the famous Maastricht Treaty, which ushered the timeline and the 
rules for launching the euro and the EMU as we know them. These criteria tackle 
either monetary, fiscal or currency stance of a candidate country. In that order of 
appearance, convergence indicators could be summarized as follows: 
1) Applicant’s inflation rate for the preceding year must have accounted for 
no more than 1.5% above the average inflation rate of the three lowest 
inflation E(M)U members; 
2) Long term interest rate (hinting at long run inflation) on applicant’s 
government bonds in the preceding year must have remained no more 
than 2% above the average long term interest rate of the three lowest-
inflation E(M)U members; 
3) Budget deficit must not exceed the threshold of 3% of the applicant’s 
GDP (“except in exceptional circumstances”); 
4) Applicant’s public debt must not exceed 60% of the country’s GDP (“or 
must be declining toward that level”) and, lastly, 
5) Applicant’s national currency must stay within its ERM26 exchange rate 
band of ±15% around the central parity for at least two years without 
outward realignments or unilateral devaluations. 
 
Be that as it may, Maastricht criteria clearly disregarded much of the optimum 
currency area scientific legacy and introduced set of indicators instead, which 
scream ‘arbitrary’ in multiple respects: they are not supported by any other 
coherent piece of economic theory either, it is unclear why specific numerical 
targets were chosen (or where it is clear - the reasoning is painfully too linear, to 
put it mildly), only to culminate with evident (and arguably deliberate) absence of 
real convergence criteria, calibrated ones at least.7 
                                                     
5 Moreover, the political set-up of EU enlargement commits accession countries to join 
the EMU at some stage after the EU accession. 
6 Originally, it used to be just ERM (Exchange Rate Mechanism), a multicurrency parity 
grid that served as converging hard-core of the EMS. ERM2 came about only with 
launching of the euro, representing essentially bilateral agreements between euro itself 
(or EMU if you will) and respectful late comers’ currencies which joined or will join the 
Eurozone subsequently.   
7 We discuss this non-calibrated, and typically less known, additional Maastricht criteria 
further at the end of this section. 
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Inflation convergence thresholds, 1) and 2), aim at enforcing the German-style 
“culture of price stability” in both short and longer run as a top monetary priority 
in E(M)U. This in turn bears consequence also for criterion 5), to be discussed 
later. Inflation criterion, nonetheless, is numerically arbitrary beyond reasonable 
doubt (why exactly 1.5% for short run or 2% above the three best performers’ 
average for the long run inflation). These rules of thumb, even if correspondent to 
EU’s reality once upon a time, nowadays pertain to no more than drastic ego-
centrism of the strongest founders and their obsolete arithmetic.  
 
Similarly, fiscal criteria too were arbitrarily designed, often unfulfilled and 
patently window-dressed. Baldwin and Wyplosz (2009) remind that EMU’s 
budget deficit criterion has been set as equivalent of the usual German golden rule 
for annual public investment (the only acceptable cause of budget deficit for them 
at the time) which typically amounted to some 3% of GDP. Cumulative public 
debt ceiling, again, has been pinpointed at 60% of GDP -according to one school 
of thought- simply because that was the average EU debt level back in 1991 when 
Maastricht criteria were being formulated. The other school of thought, first 
demonstrated by Bini-Smaghi et al. (1993), offers more rigorous proof for equally 
superficial reasoning behind this threshold. Namely, since public debt dynamics 
stems from current budget deficits as in (1), 
G(t)-T(t) = PD(t)-PD(t-1)   [1] 
 
or in terms of applicant’s current GDP, 
d(t) = p(t)- PD(t-1)/Y(t)   [2] 
 
then rearranging the second term on the right hand side yields 
PD(t-1)/Y(t)= PD(t-1)/(1+g(t))  [3] 
 
where g(t) is an annual economic growth rate. By plugging this result back into 
(2), we obtain 
d(t)(1+g(t))-g(t)p(t) =p(t)-p(t-1)  [4] 
 
Since fiscal convergence required by Maastricht criteria implies constant debt-to-
GDP over time, expression (4) collapses to  
p(t)=d(t) (1+g(t))/g(t)   [5] 
 
Now, jointly under arbitrary supposition at the time that growth rate amounts to 
5% p.a. (or 3% in real terms) and under then newly invented rule that budget 
deficit must not exceed 3%, equation (5) gave roughly 60% solution for saddle-
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point stable public debt ratio. In any case, upon launching the euro, several initial 
EMU members had been in breech of the 60% debt rule, notably Belgium, Italy 
and Greece, but strictly also Sweden, Holland ad Spain, whereas less than 3% 
budget deficit indicator was honoured only thanks to accounting tricks. Baldwin 
and Wyplosz (2009) report that France privatised portion of its state-owned 
telecomm in order to temporarily curb the deficit, Italy collected some tax 
revenues year in advance, while even Germany contemplated selling monetary 
gold in order to tune down its public finances. 
 
Finally, the road to the European monetary union goes also through the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism 2 (ERM2), which regulates the exchange rate relationships 
between the present Euroland and the future EMU members (“pre-ins”) [De 
Grauwe-Schnabl, 2004]. The ERM2 alone is a mere anteroom which allows the 
EMU to appraise the pre-in’s adjustment potential and financial stability in 
respect to monetary and exchange rate policy. But more broadly, the ERM2 is the 
overcoat and temporal yardstick of the entire Maastricht criteria set. There are no 
explicit regulations as for the timing of the ERM2 entry, but the Maastricht 
criteria require a minimum waiting period of two years before examination 
whether one is ready to leave this gym sui generis and embrace the euro. Current 
participants in ERM2 are Denmark’s krone, Estonian krone (to vanish as of 1st of 
January 2011 when Estonia will officially adopt euro), Lithuanian litas and 
Latvian lats. After deliberately failing to meet some of the convergence criteria in 
the past, which made it pointless to participate in the ERM, to Sweden has 
apparently been “let alone” in a position effectively resembling the UK’s. All the 
rest of the bigger EU members still out of Eurozone together with EU candidate 
countries have problems with choosing the right moment for obligatory ERM2 
entry and with meeting macroeconomic consequences of its dire requirements in 
practice. Couple of things is arbitrary here. Some countries, both EU members 
and EU candidates, were de iure or de facto allowed to opt out of the ERM2 
and/or euro altogether.8 In addition, despite officially announced band width of 
±15% around central parity, the ECB in reality stubbornly insists on much 
narrower corridor. Moreover, conversion rate negotiations (i.e. determination of 
central parity) lack in transparency and gain in political discretion on behalf of 
EMU over more recent euro-applicants. In short, are we witnessing not only the 
EU enlargement fatigue here, but also the antagonism of macroeconomic interests 
which may stop the euro’s “Drang nach Osten”?  
 
Having said that, it is worth noting that, recently, EMU officials began raising the 
questions of fulfillment of additional and less known Maastricht criteria, largely 
                                                     
8 Others, like Italy and Finland, for instance, were admitted in the Euroland following an 
assessment which took place before the mandatory two years in the ERM had elapsed.  
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ignored or unaware of thus far even in professional and academic circles, which 
have to do with the so-called real convergence. While it doesn’t explicitly 
quantify them, the Treaty of Maastricht indeed does mention additional 
convergence criteria, such as the position and size of the balance of payments 
disequilibria, developments in unit labour costs and other price indices, 
(un)employment rates etc. [Lavrač, 2004]. Relevantly enough, Lavrač (2004, 
pp.4-5) makes the following remark about them, and we quote: “At this moment it 
is hard to judge their real weight. They, however, certainly give the EU 
institutions some additional flexibility and discretion when evaluating readiness 
of the countries for the EMU which can be activated in the case of need.” These 
valuable and meaningful criteria, also related (for a change) to theoretical pillars 
of the OCA theory, have nevertheless never ever been called upon let alone 
applied in the case of ‘old Europe’s’ qualification for Eurozone. Enough said, for 
the time being. 
REASSESSMENT OF THE MAASTRICHT CRITERIA AND SOME 
RECTIFYING PROPOSALS 
Before proceeding with more fundamental reassessment of the Maastricht criteria, 
let us document the output of a quick and somewhat illuminating scientific 
exercise. Inspired by De Grawe (2009), we ventured to determine how many of 
the EMU members meet the Maastricht criteria today. Furthermore, logical 
comparison would enlist the current ERM2 members and other obvious Euroland 
candidates to see how they fare with the convergence indicators presently and in 
case they fulfill them to a reasonable extent, what is their macroeconomic 
performance against the performance of the rest of the European economies 
without immediate convergence criteria concern.  
 
In a nutshell, apart from Ireland, inflation criterion appears to be by and large met 
within present EMU too. Quite expectedly, however, relatively larger developing 
transition countries like Poland, Romania, Serbia and even more developed 
Turkey are having problems with keeping inflation in check without causing 
havoc in other aspects/segments of their economies. On the other hand, not a 
single EMU member (abstracting from tiny Luxembourg) is likely to abide by the 
budget deficit criterion in 2010. So if Ireland and UK have deficits four times 
greater than allowed, while France, Italy and Spain have budgetary gaps of 
roughly double the proscribed Maastricht criterion and rising, how credible is 
keeping some of the ERM2 and other EU candidates out of integration processes 
on the grounds of not meeting convergence criteria? In terms of cumulative public 
debt indicator, matters are even more ironical: in 2010, almost all of the inaugural 
EMU members are deeply in breech of the 60% GDP ceiling, while virtually all 
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of ERM2 members as well as others 9  aspiring to join the Euroland or EU 
(including entire Western Balkans, Turkey, Ukraine, Russia and the rest of the so-
called European periphery) demonstrate considerable prudence in regard to the 
public debt criterion! Nonetheless, it is painfully transparent that most of the 
newer EU members won’t be admitted to Euroland any time soon, whereas if UK, 
for instance, wanted to swap the pound for euro in spite of its debt-to-GDP of 
over 80%, it would probably happen literally overnight. Clearly, repeated 
transgressions of Maastricht criteria in the past and present when it comes to 
Western European countries coupled with all too easily dismissed leniency in the 
cases of the new members and acceding countries, suggest that euro entrance 
criteria have very little to do with economics or rules, and much to do with 
politics and inconsistent discretion [Jonas, 2004], [De Grauwe, 2009].10 
 
Notwithstanding that, explicit results of often preliminary and implicit efforts by 
candidates for E(M)U to meet the Maastricht criteria seemingly come with steep 
macroeconomic costs, some of which are genuinely degressive and ultimately 
avoidable. Reassessment of euro entrance criteria deals with these issues in 
greater depth.   
 
Inflation criterion, to begin with, would be perhaps more logically defined if 
extracted among EMU countries inflation rates, rather than entire group of EU 
members, including those who opted out of the Euroland. By and large, inflation 
in individual countries of the euro area reflects partly the conduct of monetary 
policy by the ECB, but partly their specific characteristics like income level, 
labour costs, taxes and real GDP growth, openness and sensitivity of domestic 
prices to exchange rate fluctuations etc., which are in no way related to the 
conduct of the single monetary policy. The more is any given euro area member 
different from the euro area average, the more can inflation in that particular 
country reflect its structural specificities, and commensurately less the impact of 
common monetary policy. In terms of their structural characteristics, particularly 
income level and growth, the new EU members are akin to the fastest 
growing/lowest income present euro area members. However, under the existing 
rule, or, more accurately, under the unchanged approach to the interpretation of 
the existing rule, these countries would most likely be required to replicate 
                                                     
9 With noticable exception of Hungary again. 
10 Macroeconomic determinants anyway tend to be of second order importance in both 
forming and dissolutions of currency unions through time. Currency unions typically 
dissolve when: a) there are large inflation differentials among member states, b) 
countries become protectionist (either protectionism or trade flows simply dry up due to 
exogenous or non trade-barriers driven reasons), c) but mostly and predominantly due to 
changed political sentiment, drastically altered politics or state status of the member(s) 
[Nitsch, 2004]. 
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inflation performance of countries that are at the different end of the euro area 
membership ranked by GDP size [Jonas, 2004]. Moreover, Lavrač (2004) bolsters 
the argument by asserting that low inflation doesn’t have to be always a sign of 
economic and institutional superiority, but to the contrary - could also be the 
result of worrisome macroeconomic imbalances. In addition to that, how should 
we read “three members with the best performance in terms of the price stability” 
in times of protracted recession causing evaporating inflation rates or indeed 
deflation in some of the members?! [Ibidem] These are just some of the grounds 
on which several authors, notably Buiter and Sibert (2006) and Darvas (2009), 
demanded alteration of the price stability criterion so that some kind of euro area 
average serves as a future reference point, instead of the more extreme ongoing 
rule the EMU officials stubbornly stick to. The reasoning behind this rectifying 
proposal being not only that E(M)U has changed to the point it would be unwise 
to sustain the status quo and ignore the macroeconomic needs of the newcomers 
and soon-to-be members, but also because pressing constructional weakness of 
the Maastricht criteria unsustainably specifies a number of nominal convergence 
criteria that jointly constrain if not redicule the remaining other: for instance, if an 
applicant economy has to curb current inflation and cuts down long term inflation 
expectations to the euro area levels, it might cause nominal appreciation of 
national currency and eventually the breech of narrow exchange rate band 
established under the auspices of ERM2.   
 
For as long as truly integrated pan-European bond market maintains reasonable 
real interest rate convergence, the long term interest rate criterion remains the 
least controversial of the nominal convergence criteria. Nevertheless, until not 
long ago, the so-called Walters critique (he was a counselor in Thatcher’s 
administration) has ushered the fear of divergence of national long term inflation 
rates precisely because of honouring the long term interest rate Maastricht 
criterion. Namely, due to the unified euro area-wide nominal interest rate, 
countries with higher inflation are to depress their real interest rates, whereas 
lower inflation economies will expectedly have higher real interest rates, which 
all in turn corroborate the final corollary: common monetary policy is bound to be 
more expansionary in higher inflation states and more contractionary in lower 
inflation member states [Mongelli-Wyplosz, 2008]. That notwithstanding, 
Mongelli and Wyplosz (2008) dismiss the Walters critique after analyzing the 
data on Euroland’s pre-crisis long term inflation and interest rates time series: 
since some sort of real covered interest arbitrage flattens out the real interest 
differential and balance of international competitiveness, under reasonably unified 
expectations of common currency umbrella, higher inflation and therefore 
expansionary low real interest rate causes real appreciation (drop of pseudo-real 
exchange rate) and therefore deterioration of international competitiveness, while 
conversely, lower inflation rate or deflation tendency implies real depreciation 
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(rise in real pseudo-exchange rate) which counterbalances the former effect. Alas, 
if a more serious asymmetric shock, fiscal and/or balance of payments crisis in 
one or more EMU members alters the rational expectations and (re)introduces 
uncovered real interest parity into the equation, then markets may start charging 
fundamentally different nominal interest rates to member state’s governments 
with plagued credibility quite regardless of the ECB’s quotations. Recent 
examples of Greek, Irish or Spanish crisis (although not identical among 
themselves), call for utmost caution in this regard. In a sense, this long term 
criterion’s destiny depends upon prudent national macroeconomic management 
and successful reform of other, short-term criteria. 
 
What about reassessment of the fiscal criteria? At the time of Maastricht Treaty 
preparation, the 3% deficit-to-GDP rule as well as the 60% of GDP debt 
benchmark, were considered necessary because governments have been tempted 
to create greater budget deficits in order to mitigate shocks: does that sound 
strangely familiar by any chance? This could additionally lead and has led to 
problems of sustainability of deficits and to growing government debts. Other 
negative effects would include price instability as a country that allows its debt-
to-GDP ratio to increase over a period of time would cause its own but gradually 
also the EU-wide interest rate increase. As a consequence the burden of 
government debts in other EMU countries would force them to follow more 
restrictive fiscal polices to stabilize their debt-to-GDP ratios. The above stated 
considerations contributed to the definition of numerical budgetary rules in the 
Maastricht Treaty that countries have to satisfy to become members of EMU. 
 
Our assertion is that there must be a level-playing-field correspondence between 
Euroland members and ERM2 participants in terms of both numerical fiscal 
requirements and fiscal instruments at their disposal. In other words there should 
be a tighter compatibility of Maastricht criteria and the so-called Stability and 
Growth Pact rules.11 The Stability and Growth Pact’s (SGP) main purpose is to 
ensure that the members maintain budgetary discipline following the introduction 
of a single currency. It includes a European Council resolution adopted at 
Amsterdam on 17 June 1997 and two Council Regulations of 7 July 1997. The 
two regulations were revised in June 2005 and amended after discussions on 
operation of the SGP. As it is well known (if not consistently deployed), the 
Stability and Growth Pact opens the way for the Council to penalise any 
participating member state that fails to take appropriate measures to end an 
                                                     
11 For instance, thereby it would be inconceivable for euro members to demand from 
ERM2 participants effectively procyclical fiscal policy in the face of global adversity 
while they themselves pursue countercyclical policy if not outright fiscal profligacy at 
the same time. 
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excessive deficit (the "excessive deficit procedure"). A non-interest-bearing 
deposit with the ECB would be a form of a penalty. If the excessive deficit is not 
corrected within two years it could be converted into a non-refundable fine. On 
the other hand, again, the penalties are subject to assessment of the circumstances 
by the Council. With regards to the fiscal criteria, based on the Commission 
report the Council decides weather there is an excess deficit. In most non-member 
states, fiscal deficits have been above the Maastricht reference value for some 
time especially due to the government measures undertaken to mitigate the global 
financial crisis impact. In addition, financial positions in the non-member states 
have been facing aging-related fiscal shocks. Schadler et al. (2005) argue that in 
the period before euro adoption, the candidate countries should aim at bringing 
fiscal deficit below 3% of GDP. In the case of a negative shock and assuming that 
euro qualifiers adopt the euro with the fiscal deficit close to 3%, the negative 
shock would push the deficit above 3%. Consequently, to reduce the deficit to 3% 
of GDP would require a restrictive fiscal policy which could be politically 
difficult provided the adverse effects on the employment and the economy. In the 
light of the recent shocks that have been caused by the global financial crisis, the 
authors of this paper suggest that non-member states should reduce the deficits 
below the 3% of GDP ideally before the entry in ERM2. As a result, a buffer zone 
would exist to allow shock absorption and prevent the emergence of the currency 
market nervousness that may impact the euro value. However, how politically 
feasible that is remains equally controversial issue.  
 
Furthermore, Warin (2005) and Wyplosz (2006) argued that, despite the 
justification for fiscal rules in an EMU without a centralised budget, EU fiscal 
rules may hinder economic growth in Europe. The authors consider that those 
rules reduce the margin of manoeuvre of the member countries when facing 
asymmetric shocks and are not growth promoting. That is to say that not only 
current shape of public finances by no means is secure indicator of future growth 
potential, but even more so that economic costs of lost confidence in institutions 
and decimated political support may easily overcome extra couple of percent of 
budget deficit, neglected by the still ruling neoclassical paradigm. 
 
The necessity to combine short-term flexibility and long-run fiscal discipline is a 
notoriously complex trade off. As shown above with the reference to the 
statistical data of recent and historical fiscal indicators, the problem of setting the 
quantitative ceilings is that the rules have been repeatedly broken. A solution to 
the problem could be the formation of an independent national fiscal body in 
E(M)U member states, candidate countries and economies with the strategic 
objective of becoming E(M)U members (such as Serbia). For the sake of the 
argument, this could be a council consisting of competent experts that are neutral 
with respect to the ongoing short-sighted political interests and objectives. A 
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similar approach exists and is implemented in a number of central banks of 
developed countries in the form of a monetary council. Needless to say, fiscal 
policy is highly politicised, especially the structure of public revenues as well as 
the structure of public expenditures. However, what should be excluded from 
politics with respect to the fiscal policy are the issues of budget deficit and public 
debt. Setting up medium-term and long-term deficit and public debt targets by an 
independent fiscal body may bring us a step closer to the objective of achieving 
the sustainability of budget deficit and public debt based on a more flexible, yet 
fundamentally prudent, well-balanced and overarching set of conditions, as 
outlined in reformed and sublimed convergence criteria/SGP. 
 
Finally, we don’t see full-fledged fiscal federalism as modality likely to work in 
the context of EMU, due to stark differences in economic structure and 
development level among the members (which requires taxing etc. to remain 
national prerogative in order to preserve the euro) as well as due to historically 
rooted international and political mistrust within E(M)U, in respect to each 
other’s prudence or intentions even. Nonetheless, ideal reform would institute at 
least some residual, federally administered funds, which could direct fiscal 
transfers to most adversely hit or those with the thinnest fiscal base, and -mind 
you- even before joining the euro, i.e. already in the ERM2 stage, just as the ECB, 
for example, bears responsibility for EMU-applicant’s exchange rate zone 
together with its own national central bank while at common currency anteroom. 
Alas, from the onset of E(M)U there seems to be no political willingness to 
instigate such a federal buffer, nor it is obvious where the money might come 
from [Malović, 1998]. 
 
When it comes to the exchange rate criterion and ERM2, apart from increasingly 
asymmetric impact of one-size-fits-all monetary policy in an ever more diverse 
EMU12, the issues that stand out are the following: a) does ERM2 vs. ERM makes 
a difference and in what respect, b) sustainability of nominal exchange rate target 
in small open transition economies, and lastly c) timing of ERM2 entry, or indeed, 
if unilateral euroisation appears more appealing than policy constraints of ERM2, 
is that an option, for whom and when exactly.  
 
Essentially, there are very few differences between ERM and ERM2. The former 
was multilateral symmetrical parity grid, but in reality de facto DM-zone, the 
                                                     
12 Therefore, as emphasized many times before, giving up monetary independence may be 
costly especially for the EMU applicants, when they are hit by asymmetric shocks and 
cannot efficiently substitute monetary policy with some alternative stabilizing 
mechanisms [Lättemäe, 2003]. On the other hand, Buiter and Sibert (2006) suggest that 
asynchronous schocks can be beneficial in currency union with integrated financial 
markets since they increase the scope for and return on investment diversification. 
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latter being de iure bilateral euro-zone. In both mechanisms countries couldn’t 
unilaterally determine their currency parities,13 nor were they solely responsible 
for maintaining them. The main problem with ERM2 is that it was mainly 
designed to protect those already in the Euroland from potential competitive 
devaluations/depreciations of the candidate-currencies [Fölsz, 2003]. The straight-
forward implication of that being that it’s high time for ECB to stop insisting on 
narrower bands than required by the ERM2 itself, thereby enabling “the outs” to 
still retain some monetary sovereignty and occasionally deviate from uncovered 
interest parity without fundamentally endangering the exchange rate criterion.14 
ECB’s supporting interventions along those of the respective central bank should 
be slightly more frequent and more generous, baring in mind that, while in ERM2, 
EMU applicants are especially vulnerable. Opponents of such a policy contend 
that wider bands, by abandoning tightly pegged target zones, cannot credibly 
serve as nominal convergence anchors. The extent to which this assertion is false 
and all the arguments as well as empirically tested wider currency bands which 
point to the contrary have been discussed at great length in Malović (2007), inter 
alia, so we won’t dwell on it in this treatise.  
 
Even though Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson (HBS hereafter) appreciation effect as a 
result of transitional catching-up process may be a bit overrated in some instances, 
it does cause problems to inflation criterion as well as to exchange rate 
management within ERM2. It is a side-effect of desired but non-quantified real 
convergence process, yet it may open a conflicting gap in respect to nominal 
convergence as dictated by the Maastricht criteria [De Grauwe-Schnabl, 2004]. 
Namely, the currency of fast growing economy appreciates relative to that of the 
more slowly growing economy, either through nominal appreciation in case of 
managed floats or through inflation differential channel in case of fixed exchange 
rate regime. Jonas (2004) underlines that it’s almost impossible to peg the 
exchange rate while at the same time maintaining control over money supply (and 
thus inflation). Orlowski and Rybinski (2005), however, by extending widely 
popular flexible inflation targeting framework into de facto monetary conditions 
index, confirm the difficulty of the task, but demonstrate it is not impossible: by 
assigning interest rate instrument to changes in relative (Polish versus Euro-area) 
inflation forecast, whereas foreign exchange reserves interventions to exchange 
rate stabilisation, the framework can work at least for a while and in good times. 
More serious perils, in our opinion, should be recognized in and during 
international capital flow reversals, their sudden occurrence made possible by 
                                                     
13 Central parities of the ERM2 currencies vis-a-vis euro are determined among finance 
ministers of EU member states, ECB and central banks' governors of ERM2 
participants, after taking into consideration Comission's proposal [Fölsz, 2003, p.6]. 
14 Letting Slovakia into EMU looks like a long awaited step forward in that respect. 
Chapter 1. Maastricht Criteria at the Age of 28  23
mandatory dismantling of capital controls immediately before entering the EU. At 
such a fragile point, applicants still could not rely on superior institutional imports, 
benefits of euro-wide capital market or banking system, but they ought to be able 
to draw swiftly from ECB’s reputation and size through both verbal and open 
market operations/swaps15 channel. On their own, national policy makers should 
strive to avoid sterilisation as well as appreciation, by rapidly repaying foreign 
debt together with expanding industrial policies and country’s export oriented 
productive capacities.  
 
More often than not, HBS effect alone could be accommodated even within the 
narrower (±2.25%) version of exchange rate stability criterion, but be that as it 
may, applicant countries/their currencies should ideally enter ERM2 in peaceful 
times and at such a level of economic development that forces pressing towards 
any excess inflation or appreciation are actually modest and/or retreating. In 
addition, we advise against entering ERM2 if Ricardian equivalence doesn’t hold, 
fiscal policies appear imprudent or if the large-scale administrative price control 
is still in place. Moreover, for several criteria if not all, some countries may wish 
to pursue nominal convergence even before formally entering the ERM2, since it 
seems wise to aim at fulfilling Maastricht criteria at least a year ahead of the 
planned date of entrance due to lengthy administrating procedures (this being 
especially advisable to overachievers deliberating speedy entrance) [Lavrač, 
2004]. However, struggling history of recent enlargements of Euroland suggests 
that speedy accessions seldom work out, 16  hence small economies with little 
industrial production and those having clearly identified interest in hasty adoption 
of euro, might stand a better chance with outright unilateral eurisation. In this case, 
the euro would circulate in parallel to the domestic currency, or perhaps replace it 
altogether. In any event, this action would assume that national authorities fix the 
value of the domestic currency in terms of the euro, rather than participating in 
the ERM2 target band arrangement for two years before entering EMU [Meade-
Mueller-Plantenberg-Pisani, 2002]. Blessing of dollarisation is by all means 
always mixed and never completely irrevocable,17 but for those whom it might 
                                                     
15 Similar to ones offered by the ECB to Denmark and Sweden, for example. 
16 For instance, Lättemäe (2003) and most strikingly Darvas (2009) describe formidable 
obstacles, promises to and disappointments of Baltic countries in their attempts to give 
up their currency board or even dollarisation arrangements in favour of ERM2. Thus, 
there is a stark contradiction between the huge loans granted from the EU and 
elsewhere to support Latvia in maintaining its exchange rate peg and the denial of 
Latvia’s euro-area prospects by EU officials [Darvas, 2009]. In presence of tequila 
effect of global crisis across South and East Europe, this appears yet another example 
of selfish and dangerous game played out by Brussels and Frankfurt.   
17  Crisis driven exit from dollarisation by Equador constitutes a note-worthy caveat 
[Darvas, 2009]. 
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serve it is in fact a viable option. Not only that some older members avoided 
spending entire two years in ERM, but what's more, despite ostentatious verbal 
threats by the ECB and Commision basically nothing ever happened to economies 
which eurised without explicit EMU's consent (like Montenegro e.g.). After all, 
ERM2 is too cumbesome from the outsiders view point, and too defensively 
designed to serve the interests of those already in. Nevertheless, for countries 
capable of utilizing non-negligable benefits of autonomous monetary policy 
making and floating exchange rate, like Poland, Czech Republic, Croatia or 
Serbia, the choice is probably less easy one and not likely to point in eurisation 
direction anyway. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, we performed reevaluation of the Maastricht (convergence) criteria 
from the view point of ERM2 members and other acceding countries aiming to 
join the Euroland in the proximate future. It appears that Maastricht criteria 
implicate serious flaws and even drawbacks both from the economic theory 
standpoint and particularly having in mind logical socio-economic priorities of 
less-developed transitional applicants at the outskirts of Europe. The entire 
nominal convergence set, but especially inflation, fiscal and exchange rate criteria, 
seem to be designed primarily to shield the interests of those already in the 
Eurozone, rather than serving as a vehicle for faster and safer euro-accession of 
the candidates. Hence, it would be not only analytically easy to show that keeping 
the same and rather asymmetrically-tackling rules in a vastly expanding E(M)U 
violates the equal treatment principle, but also that so obsolete convergence 
criteria arguably aren’t in the interest of EMU as a whole either any more. 
Consequently, at least inflation and long term interest rate criteria could be related 
to the euro area average rather than three best performing countries. Along the 
same lines, fundamental reform of fiscal criteria in parallel with SGP reform 
could establish more flexible albeit credibly prudent fiscal guidelines entrusted to 
politically independent national fiscal bodies among the applicants, whereas 
existing EMU members would have to clean up the mess of their own fiscal 
profligacy and establish the level playing field on the matter. Furthermore, quite 
independently from dubious effectiveness of several if not all of the nominal 
convergence criteria, and deliberately left room for ambiguous interpretation by 
‘insiders’ of their fulfillment, previously admitted EMU members could always 
(and expectedly in crisis times) resort to non-quantified real convergence criteria 
from the Maastricht Treaty in order to block candidate countries on their way to 
Euroland. This might happen on economic, financial or clearly nationalistic 
(political) basis. Nevertheless, once the E(M)U applicants realise that they are 
knocking on the door of –in many aspects- 'dragged party with lights on and beer 
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running out', as well as when old E(M)U members on their behalf realise the size 
of highly skilled imigration injection their economic area and common currency 
both badly need, there should be common ground for mutually beneficial reform 
of Maastricht (convergence) criteria.  
 
Otherwise, however, alternatives remaining differ pending on structural, 
geographic and future strategic traits of economies at hand. Small(er) service 
based countries may indeed emerge better of by unilaterally adopting the euro, 
thereby avoiding the most of the messy Maastricht hustle all together. Larger, 
more heavily populated and more industrial countries, on the other hand, probably 
must seek either consensual euroisation deal or give it all up (even intentionally 
postpone) for a longer period. Having said that, too much procrastination on 
Brussels behalf, surely diminishes the benefits and elongates the costs of common 
currency adoption for E(M)U applicants according to standard OCA theory and 
the latest research in this field.18  
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